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TOPIC V.A.l 
PAUL MARCUS 
The Use of Criminal Statutes to Regulate 
Financial Markets in the United States 
Historically, violations relating to financial markets1 in the 
United States have been primarily addressed in non-criminal set-
tings. Private civil actions2 and administrative enforcement actions3 
have been utilized widely over the past fifty years. Today, however, 
Americans see considerable activity in the criminal justice system 
PAUL MARcus is Haynes Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Williams-
burg, Virginia. I gratefully acknowledge the thoughtful comments of my colleague 
Raj Bhala. 
1. The discussion here is principally offederal securities laws, not offenses relat-
ing to banking or derivatives markets. Many other laws can be raised as well. See, 
for instance, these statutes: money laundering, 18 U.S.C §§ 1956, 1957; false state-
ments, 18 U.S.C. § 1001; public utility holding company, 15 U.S.C. § 79; investment 
company, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a, 80b; bank secrecy, 12 U.S.C § 1951-1959; bank holding 
company, 12 U.S.C. § 1841-1850. See generally, Pickholtz, Securities Crimes. 
2. The implied civil action for damages under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 is of particular significance, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Though the statute itself does 
not set out any right for individuals to file suit for fraudulent behavior, the courts 
have consistently inferred such a right from the text of the statute and its legislative 
purpose. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 165 (1994); Superintendent 
of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). Recognition of the 
private action, however, has resulted in decades of complex litigation concerning the 
meaning and scope of the civil suit. All of these difficult questions have been explored 
by United States courts in connection with the securities laws as applied to private 
civil claims: which individuals have standing to bring an action, what behavior con-
stitutes fraud, are the parties required to be in a fiduciary relationship, what state of 
mind by the defendant is required, can the plaintiff demonstrate a causal link be-
tween the fraud and the loss, what is the appropriate measure of damages? 
Recently, Congress expanded the litigation options available to private investors 
by passing the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, which 
complements the judicially created rights under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
Even more recently, however, Congress imposed limitations on private actions in the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Pub. L. 104-67, 108 Stat. 737. Po-
tentially, the Act may substantially alter the maniler in which private rights of action 
are utilized in the securities fraud area. At this time, however, it appears too early to 
determine if that potential will in fact be realized. See Pitt, Groskaufmanis, Hardison 
& Johnson, "Promises Made, Promises Kept: The Practical Implications of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995," 33 San Diego L. Rev. 845 (1996). 
3. The federal administrative agencies chiefly responsible for bringing enforce-
ment actions are the Securities Exchange Commission, (SEC) (for securities law viola-
tions), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (for banking law 
violations), and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (for violations relating 
to exchange-traded derivatives). 
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designed to limit abuse in the markets. This prosecutorial activity 
falls into two categories: traditional sorts of general criminal offenses 
as applied to market abuses, and specific statutes designed for finan-
cial crimes. Each ofthe two is important and shall be explored in this 
article. 
CONSPIRACY 
The conspiracy offense is widely charged by both state and fed-
eral prosecutors.4 It is especially helpful in connection with financial 
crimes, as such crimes often involve multiple defendants joining to-
gether to engage in market abuses. Conspiracy consists of an agree-
ment between two or more people formed for the purpose of 
committing a crime. The offense combines a high state of mind re-
quirement and a relatively low act element. Intent on the part of the 
defendants to agree and also to achieve the object of the conspiracy 
must be shown.5 Once an agreement is established, however, any 
limited act of preparation completes the offense. 
In most conspiracy cases, the prosecution is presented with a 
completed substantive crime, and there is normally no direct evi-
dence of the formation of the conspiracy.6 As a result, most conspir-
acy cases are proven through circumstantial evidence. Occasionally, 
evidence of prior contacts or a relationship between the co-conspira-
tors is used to demonstrate agreement, but most often the inferences 
are drawn from the defendants' joint participation in the criminal 
acts. 
While the agreement requirement is followed in most American 
jurisdictions, some states use a unilateral approach allowing for pros-
ecution of an individual who erroneously believes she has reached an 
agreement with another. That other person feigns agreement and 
does not have a true interest in joining the criminal enterprise. Most 
often this person would be an undercover police officer. The majority, 
"meeting of the minds" requirement would not allow prosecution in 
such a situation to go forward. The reasoning here is that there is no 
heightened danger of group criminal action when only one person 
genuinely intends to follow through with the object of the agreement. 
The unilateral approach promotes such prosecutions, mandating only 
that a defendant believe that there is an agreement. The notion is 
that even a unilateral actor is culpable in that she has intent, has a 
4. See Marcus, "Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back from an Ever Ex-
panding, Ever More Troubling Area," 1 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rights J. 1 (1992). 
5. United States v. Ciocca, 106 F.3d 1079, 1084 (1st Cir. 1997). 
6. Marcus, supra n. 4. 
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guilty mind, and has done everything in her power to plot the com-
mission of a crime.7 
The conspiracy offense can be a powerful prosecutorial tool. 
Each member of the group is held responsible for the crimes of co-
conspirators if those crimes are committed in furtherance of the plan, 
and are reasonably foreseeable to the parties.8 Other principles gov-
erning conspiracy cases similarly support prosecution efforts. Of spe-
cial benefit are rules as to co-conspirator declarations, venue, joinder 
of parties, and application of statutes of limitations.9 
Punishment for convicted conspirators can be severe. In general, 
the commission of the substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit 
it are viewed as separate and distinct offenses, they do not merge. 10 
Moreover, consecutive sentences for the two crimes may be given.11 
In addition, a single agreement with multiple objects may give rise to 
multiple punishment for conspiracy. When such an agreement vio-
lates two or more statutory provisions describing specific conspiracy 
offenses, there are separate crimes if each provision requires proof of 
a fact that the other does not. Hence, distinct prosecutions under 
such specific conspiracy statutes is viewed as appropriate, even 
though only one agreement can be shown.12 
Most American jurisdictions have enacted conspiracy statutes. 
In the federal system, specific statutes cover conspiracy in a host of 
areas.13 The federal government also has a general conspiracy stat-
ute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371, which is divided into two components. The 
first makes it a crime for two or more persons to conspire "to commit 
any offense against the United States." The second makes it a crime 
to conspire "to defraud the United States or any agency thereof in any 
manner for any purpose." This latter provision makes the statute 
more expansive in its reach, for it encompasses "not only conspiracies 
that might involve the loss of government funds, but also 'any con-
spiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing, or defeating the 
lawful function of any department of government."'14 This interpre-
tation of the law has particular significance to the prosecution of fi-
nancial crimes. 
The conspiracy charge is used often in connection with financial 
crimes. The money laundering statute prohibits transactions involv-
ing proceeds of criminal activity with intent to promote the unlawful 
7. See generally, Paul Marcus, Prosecution and Defense of Criminal Conspiracy 
Cases, § 2.04 (1997). 
8. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). 
9. Marcus, supra n. 4. 
10. Pinkerton v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. at 643. 
11. Id. 
12. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981). 
13. With drug offenses, under Title 18 of the U.S. Code, for example. Id. 
14. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966). 
592 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 46 
activity, or with intent to violate the Internal Revenue Code, or with 
knowledge that the transaction is designed to avoid currency transac-
tion reporting requirements.15 The law also contains a separate con-
spiracy provision which highlights the seriousness of the offense: 
"Any person who conspires to commit any offense defined in this sec-
tion ... shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for 
the offense the commission of which was the object of the 
conspiracy."16 
While the language of the money laundering statute is fairly di-
rect, issues with application have regularly surfaced especially in 
conspiracy prosecutions. See, for instance, United States v. Stavrou-
lakis,17 where the defendant was approached by an undercover FBI 
agent who expressed an interest in laundering money derived from 
narcotics transactions. The defendant agreed, but he decided to tell 
his co-conspirator that the money came from gambling, because that 
individual "appeared to have scruples about -laundering narcotics 
money."18 The court determined that the government had properly 
proven a conspiracy to launder unlawfully acquired money, as it is 
not necessary that the conspirators agree on the source of the unlaw-
ful money. It is only essential that the cash is represented to have 
come from one of the many illegal activities enumerated.19 
Questions may also be raised as to evidence of a true conspiracy 
to control the funds. In United States v. Schmidt,20 the defendant 
and another person had an initial meeting with undercover Internal 
Revenue Service agents, at which an operation to divide large sums 
of money into smaller, non-reportable amounts was discussed .. Only 
at later meetings, with the defendant alone, did the agents tell him 
that the funds to be laundered were the proceeds of illegal activity. 
Throughout the meetings, the defendant used the term "we" in 
describing the scheme, but he asserted that he and his friend served 
different functions. The conspiracy conviction was affirmed with the 
court deciding that evidence concerning a defendant's meetings with 
government agents at which a money laundering operation was dis-
cussed was sufficient. A jury could draw the inference that a conspir-
acy existed between the defendant and the purported co-conspirator 
rather than simply between the one defendant and the government 
agent.21 
Conspiracy may also be charged in connection with statutes reg-
ulating financial markets such as the Securities and Exchange Act of 
15. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956. 
16. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956(h). 
17. 952 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 1982. 
18. Id. at 688. 
19. ld. at 691. 
20. 947 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1991). 
21. ld. at 367-68. 
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1934, discussed infra. These statutes, enforced by the Securities Ex-
change Commission, make it "a criminal offense 'willfully' to violate 
any oftheir provisions, any related rule, or related order."22 The gen-
eral federal conspiracy provision, 18 U.S.C. Sec 371, may then be 
used to charge a conspiracy to commit an "offense against the United 
States."23 Such cases also often include a charge of conspiring "to 
defraud the United States by impeding, impairing, obstructing and 
attempting to defeat the lawful functions of ... the [SEC] in the pro-
tection of the investing public."24 Consistent with the usual merger 
rules, there is no improper multiplicity in charging conspiracy along 
with a substantive violation of the securities sta,tutes.25 Moreover, 
the availability of civil penalties does not violate double jeopardy 
principles when a conspiracy charge is brought, as in United States u. 
Merriam. 26 There, criminal indictments for conspiracy were offered 
against two defendants who had previously been given lifetime bars 
in proceedings conducted by the SEC and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers. The court held that the criminal proceedings 
were not precluded by the doctrine of double jeopardy because Con-
gress intended the SEC and NASD sanctions to be remedial, not 
punitive. 
Increasingly, criminal conspiracy charges are used in punishing 
banking and revenue violations. Historically, the "conspiracy to de-
fraud the United States" language of Section 371 related primarily to 
the loss of government funds, such as with tax evasion. 27 As noted 
earlier, the statutory language has since been construed to include a 
larger variety of cases. For example, the creation of artificial tax 
losses is covered by the conspiracy statute as an act that would inter-
fere with or obstruct a lawful government function by deceit, craft or 
trickery. 28 
The Bank Secrecy Act requires that all transactions in currency 
of more than $10,000 with financial institutions be reported by the 
financial institution conducting the transaction.29 In complying with 
this statute, financial institutions file currency transaction reports 
(CTRs). In recent prosecutions, bank tellers and other officials who 
evaded the CTR reporting duties that were binding on them have 
been charged with conspiracy to commit an offense against the 
United States.30 Bank customers who commit "money structuring'' 
22. Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation 4751 (1996). 
23. Id. at 4770. 
24. United States v. Guterma, 281 F.2d 742, 745 (2nd Cir. 1960), cert. denied 364 
u.s. 871. 
25. United States v. Groover, 957 F.2d 796 (lOth Cir. 1992). 
26. 108 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1997). 
27. Marcus, supra n. 7, Sec. 9.02. 
28. Id. at Sec. 9.02[3]. 
29. 31 C.F.R. Sees. 103.22(a)(l), 103.27(a). 
30. United States v. Puerto, 730 F.2d 627 (11th Cir. 1984). 
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by dividing large amounts of cash into smaller, non-reportable trans-
actions may be charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States. 
The theory behind such a charge is that the conspiracy contemplates 
obstructing the government function of receiving CTRs when the cus-
tomers avoid the incurring of reporting duties. 31 
RICO 
In 1970, Congress passed the Organized Crime Control Act 
which contained the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions statute, more commonly known as "RIC0".32 RICO was primar-
ily enacted to combat organized crime; many states have adopted 
their own versions which usually track federallaw.33 Nearly all of 
these RICO statutes contain a civil remedy component as well, with 
elements equivalent to the criminal RICO provision. 34 
The RICO statute requires a showing: 
1) that a person; 
2) conduct a pattern; 
3) of racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt; 
4) directly or indirectly through; 
A) investment in; 
B) maintenance of an interest in, or; 
C) participation in; 
5) an enterprise; 
6) the activities of which affect interstate commerce. 35 
The most important elements of RICO are the pattern of racke-
teering activity and the enterprise. The government must prove a 
connection between these provisions. The pattern of a racketeering 
activity consists of two or more specific crimes committed within 10 
years of each other. In Sedima v. Imrex Co. 36 the United States 
Supreme Court noted that a pattern is not necessarily sustained sim-
ply by proof of two acts. The Court wrote that "continuity plus rela-
tionship" combines to create a pattern.37 The pattern element was 
further clarified in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. 38 
There the Court stated that Congress envisioned "a concept of suffi-
cient breadth that it might encompass multiple predicates within a 
31. United States v. Richter, 610 F. Supp. 480, 486 (N.D. Ill. 1985), affd sub nom. 
United States v. Mangovski, 785 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1986). See generally, United 
States v. Vasquez, 53 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 1995). 
32. 18 u.s.c. 1962. 
33. Marcus, supra n. 7, § 4.03. 
34. ld. 
35. McDonough v. National Home Ins., 108 F.3d 174, 177 (8th Cir. 1997); Mira v. 
Nuclear Measurements Corp., 107 F.3d 466, 473 (7th Cir. 1997). 
36. 473 u.s. 479 (1985). 
37. ld. at 496 n. 14. 
38. 492 u.s. 229 (1989). 
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single scheme that were related and that amounted to, or threatened 
the likelihood of, continued criminal activity.39 
The enterprise element refers to "any individual, partnership, 
corporation, association, or other legal entity, an any union or group 
of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."4° For 
some time, lower courts disagreed on the application of the term in 
connection with illegal operations. United States v. Turkette,41 held 
that "neither the language nor the structure of RICO limits its appli-
cation to legitimate enterprises.42 
While RICO is used often with drug and violent crimes, it is also 
applied to financial offenses. Among the acts listed as parts of racke-
teering activity in the statute are: financial institution fraud, embez-
zlement from pension and welfare funds, laundering of monetary 
instruments, and illegal monetary transactions in property.43 
Two of the most well known cases in the area involve quite differ-
ent forms of criminal activity. In United States v. Bledsoe,44 the gov-
ernment, after charging a RICO violation, proved that the defendants 
were involved with a fraudulent scheme to sell securities of agricul-
tural cooperatives. In essence, the prosecution theory was that the 
defendants engaged in fraud in attempting to manipulate buyers of 
these securities. The court focused carefully on the association of the 
individuals into an enterprise, as required by the statute. 
The defendants in United States v. Cauble,45 were members of 
the highly publicized "Cowboy Mafia". The group engaged in wide 
ranging criminal activities ranging from distribution of marijuana to 
misapplication of bank funds. All these activities were brought to-
gether for trial under a RICO charge, with the government success-
fully arguing that the various distinct criminal acts constituted a 
pattern pursued for illegal gain by the enterprise. 
FRAUD 
Abusers of the financial markets may also face prosecution by 
the United States under the mail fraud and wire fraud laws. These 
statutes are important because of the ''breadth, flexibility and ease of 
application to almost every variant of fraudulent conduct."46 
39. Id. at 237. 
40. 18 u.s.c. § 1961(4). 
41. 452 u.s. 576 (1981). 
42. Id. at 587. 
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(c). 
44. 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1992). 
45. 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983). 
46. Pickholz, supra n. 1, § 5.05 [1], page 5-48. The author there states: 
Mail and wire fraud ... not only stand alone as serious substantive offenses, 
but they also serve as the ubiquitous handmaidens to virtually every securi-
ties fraud violation, act as predicate offenses to establish a "pattern ofracke-
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The mail fraud statute reads, in part: 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme 
or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representation, or 
promises . . . for the purposes of executing such scheme or 
artifice or attempting to do so, places in any post office or 
authorized depository for mail matter ... shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both. If the violation affects a financial institution, such per-
son shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned 
not more than 30 years, or both.47 
The wire fraud statute similarly forbids the furtherance of a 
fraud, prohibiting such activities by use of wire, radio or television.48 
In the context of financial markets, the mail and fraud statutes 
"reach a universe of deceitful activity, including insider trading, mar-
ket manipulation, fraudulent offering and reporting schemes, and 
conversion of customer funds. 49 The mail and wire fraud statutes are 
even more flexible in the securities context. These statutes do not 
require the scheme to be in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities, and plans based on a breach of fiduciary duty or misappro-
priation are also within the scope of them. 5° 
The elements of proof for a mail fraud conviction consist of a 
scheme or artifice to defraud, the use of the United States mails in 
furtherance of the scheme, and an intent on the part of the defendant 
to defraud.51 To prove wire fraud, the prosecution must additionally 
show use of an interstate wire service or electronic communications 
to further the scheme. 52 These statutes are powerful tools, for each 
mailing or wire transmission in furtherance of a single plan to de-
teering activity" under the RICO statute, and constitute a "specified unlawful 
activity" sufficient to implicate the harsh federal money laundering statutes. 
Id. at 5-49. 
47. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341. 
48. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343. 
49. Pickholz, supra n. 1, § 5.05[1) at 5-49. 
50. Id. 
51. Dreher v. United States, 115 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Loaya, 107 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Slevin, 106 F.3d 1086, 1089 
(2nd Cir. 1996); United States v. Bonnano, 852 F.2d 434, 440 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 1016 (1989). 
Courts have also found that a conviction for mail fraud "does not require that the 
defendant actually intended to use the mails, but only that he acted with knowledge 
that the mails would be used in the ordinary course of business." United States v. 
Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1073 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Earles, 955 F.2d 1175 
(8th Cir. 1992); Bacchus Indus. v. Arvin Indus., 939 F.2d 887 (lOth Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Parker, 839 F.2d 1473, 1482 (1988). 
52. Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1481 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1073 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Earles, 955 F.2d 1175 
(8th Cir. 1992); Bacchus Indus. v. Arvin Indus., 939 F.2d 887 (lOth Cir. 1991). 
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fraud is a distinct offense for which courts may impose separate 
sentences.53 
Courts have traditionally found that any scheme intended to de-
prive another of property or money through deceit is a "scheme or 
artifice to defraud" under the fraud statutes.54 Courts were in con-
flict, however, over the question of the statutes including schemes to 
deprive of the intangible right to honest services. The Supreme 
Court explicitly rejected the inclusion of intangible rights in McNally 
v. United States.55 In response, Congress enacted § 1346 in 1988, 
overruling McNally and defining the meaning of"scheme or artifice to 
defraud" to include "a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the 
intangible right of honest services."56 
Prosecutors may often combine traditional fraud offenses with 
specific securities charges in combatting market abuses, as in United 
States v. Mackay .57 There, the defendants were convicted of both 
mail fraud and securities fraud for improperly gaining control of an 
insurance company through stock purchases and using facilities of 
interstate commerce in the process. Though the charged behavior 
was a single course of action, the court of appeals affirmed the two 
convictions. The court found that "the essentials of mail fraud are 
proof of a scheme to defraud plus the use of the mails to execute or 
further this scheme or design ... each mailing is regarded as a sepa-
rate crime even though it relates to essentially the same fraudulent 
scheme."58 
United States v. Carpenter59 is a leading Supreme Court decision 
in the fraud area, presenting an excellent example of how the federal 
fraud statutes have been successful weapons against the misappro-
priation of confidential information in the securities context. A re-
porter for The Wall Street Journal was a co-author of a daily 
investment advice column reporting on various stocks and compa-
nies. The column frequently had an impact on those stocks men-
tioned in the column. A stockbroker promised the reporter part of the 
profits in return for advance notice of the substance of the column. 
This agreement was in direct violation of The Wall Street Journal's 
policy that all news information belongs solely to the Journal and is 
53. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916). 
54. Some courts have gone beyond this basic proposition. In United States v. 
Marchese, 46 F.3d 1020 (lOth Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2251 (1995), the 
government alleged that the defendants, without revealing who controlled the stocks 
and without disclosing that the brokers were receiving kickbacks, induced customers 
to transfer funds to those brokers. The court of appeals held that a charge of mail 
fraud does not have to prove pecuniary loss or be able to trace the alleged kickbacks. 
55. 483 u.s. 350 (1987). 
56. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346. 
57. 491 F.2d 616 (lOth Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 972. 
58. Id. at 619. 
59. 484 u.s. 19 (1987). 
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deemed confidential prior to publication. The reporter and the stock-
broker were convicted of violating not only Rule lOb-5, but also the 
federal mail and wire fraud statutes. 
The Court unanimously affirmed the fraud convictions, finding 
that "the conspiracy here to trade on the Journal's confidential infor-
mation is not outside the reach of the mail and wire fraud statues .... 
The Journal's business information that it intended to be kept confi-
dential was its property .... "60 The Court added that "it is sufficient 
that the Journal has been deprived of its right to exclusive use of the 
information, for exclusivity is an important aspect of confidential 
business information and most private property for that matter."61 
Interestingly, the mail and wire fraud statutes were not utilized be-
cause of the method used of exchanging information between the re-
porter and the stockbroker; rather the fraud statutes were implicated 
by the circulation of the newspaper. 
Using the wires and the mail to print and send the Journal 
to its customers [did in fact] satisfy the requirement that 
those mediums be used to execute the scheme .... Had the 
column not been made available to Journal customers, there 
would have been no effect on stock prices and no likelihood of 
profiting from the information leaked by [the reporter].62 
SPECIFIC MARKET RELATED CRIMINAL STATUTES 
Securities violations in the United States are addressed in a vari-
ety of contexts, as indicated previously: administrative hearings, civil 
actions, broad criminal prosecutions. In part, because of the cumber-
some SEC referral process and the complexity of securities law, his-
torically relatively few criminal proceedings were initiated under the 
securities laws.63 In the past two decades, however, SEC enforce-
ment lawyers and Department of Justice prosecutors have begun to 
bring more criminal prosecutions against securities violators in order 
to provide effective deterrence and to maintain investor confidence in 
response to perceived widespread securities problems.64 Such prose-
cutions can be brought under two principal statutes. 
60. ld. at 28. 
61. Id. at 26-27. 
62. Id. at 28. 
63. Baird, A Practical Guide to the 'Criminalization' of Securities Cases, C640 
ALI-ABA 7, 9 (1991). 
64. ld. at 10. 
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The Securities Act of 1933 
The 1933 Act provides criminal penalties for violations. 
Although criminal liability itself is created in Section 24 of the Act,65 
the violations occur under two basic provisions of the Securities Act-
registration and antifraud. 
Section 5 of the Act makes it illegal for an individual to sell any 
unregistered security through interstate commerce unless a specific 
exemption exists.66 The section specifically prohibits the use of mails 
or any means of interstate commerce either to sell unregistered (or 
nonexempt) securities or to carry securities for sale or for delivery 
after sale.67 It further provides that it is unlawful for any person to 
use the mails or any means of interstate commerce to transmit a pro-
spectus for a security unless the prospectus meets certain require-
ments or to deliver a security unless accompanied by an SEC-
approved prospectus.Gs 
The reach of Section 5 is broad. Some courts have liberally con-
strued the requirement of use of mails or interstate commerce by 
holding the floor of a national securities exchange a means of commu-
nications which would satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the 
Act.69 Almost anyone can be held criminally liable, not just the tech-
nical issuer, but also the underwriter or dealer.70 Moreover, igno-
rance of the securities laws is not a defense. 71 
In addition to criminal liability for Section 5 violations, the 1933 
Act also provides for criminal penalties for the violation of the an-
tifraud provisions in Section 17.72 Section 17(a) requires proof by the 
government of both material misrepresentations (or omissions) in a 
registration statement, and an intent to violate the law.73 The courts 
generally find that the intent requirement "relates to the action con-
65. 15 U.S.C. § 77x. Section 24 provides that any person who willfully violates 
any provisions, rules and regulations of the statute in filing a registration statement 
is guilty of a felony and subject to a fine and/or imprisonment. 
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e. "Registration" refers to the process whereby an issuer of 
securities obtains clearance from the SEC as to the written documentation, specifi-
cally the "registration statement," of which the prospectus is a part. This clearance 
must be obtained before the securities are sold, and thus assures the investing public 
that the issuer does not make materially false or misleading statements in the writ-
ten documentation used by the issuer to persuade investors to buy the securities. 
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a). "Exempt" securities are those that may be sold, or 
offered for sale, without an SEC-approved registration statement. 
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b). 
69. See, e.g., United States v. Re, 336 F.2d 306, 315 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 
379 u.s. 904 (1964). 
70. United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 
946 (1969). 
71. Id. 
72. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a). 
73. Id. The standard for materiality, set forth not in the 1933 Act but rather in 
the landmark case ofTSC v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976) is (in essence) whether a 
reasonable investor would want to know of the fact in making an investment decision. 
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stituting fraudulent, misleading or deceitful conduct, but not as to 
the knowledge that the instrument is a security.74 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
While the 1933 Act governs the issuance of securities in the pri-
mary market-initial public offerings-the 1934 Act concerns secon-
dary market trading of securities-buying and selling of securities 
that already have been issued. The most widely litigated criminal 
provision of the 1934 Act, and indeed federal securities law generally, 
is Section 10, and the corresponding SEC Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 
Act.75 Section 10(b) makes it illegal to use "any manipulative or de-
ceptive device" in the purchase and sale of any security in contraven-
tion of the rules and regulations the SEC may establish for the public 
interest or for the protection of public investors. 76 Rule 10b-5 prohib-
its making any materially false statements "in connection" with the 
purchase and sale or securities. 77 The Rule requires a demonstration 
of material misrepresentations or omissions that a reasonable share-
holder would consider.78 Not all courts require a showing of intent to 
violate the law for a Rule 10b-5 or Section 10(b) prosecution. A "reali-
zation" of a wrongful act may be all that is needed. 79 
Much of the controversy since the mid 1980's concerning Section 
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 relates to insider trading prosecutions.8° For 
many years, insider trading violations were premised upon two con-
flicting theories, classical and misappropriation.81 Under the classi-
74. Brown v. United States, 578 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 928 (1978). Consistent with the usual rules of proof in criminal cases, the intent 
need not be shown by direct evidence. United States v. Vasen, 222 F.2d 3, 7 (7th Cir. 
1955); Aiken v. United States, 108 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1939); United States v. Vander-
see, 279 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 943 (1961). 
75. Section 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j; Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240-10b-5. See A Jacobs, 
Litigation and Practice Under Rule lOb-5 (Securities Law Series, Clark Boardman 
Callaghan). 
76. 15 u.s.c. § 78j(b). 
77. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
78. Id. 
79. See, e.g., Arthur Lipper Co. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978); United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 351-52 (9th 
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976); United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 
1397 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Koenig, 388 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
80. But not all. The Securities Exchange Act prohibits manipulation of exchange 
listed securities through Section 9, making it illegal "[t]o effect ... a series of transac-
tions in any security registered on a national securities exchange creating actual or 
apparent active trading ... or raising or depressing the price of such security, for the 
purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others." 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j(a)(2). Also, disclosure and filing violations are found in Sections 12, 13, 14 and 
16, § 78 1, m, n, and p. Section 12 of the Act additionally requires certain companies 
to register and file periodic reports. Moreover, sections 13 and 14 provide for the pro-
tection of investors by requiring full disclosure and giving public shareholders ade-
quate information with which to respond to tender offers. 
81. See generally, Bayne, "Insider Trading and the Misappropriation Theory," 30 
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 487 (1997). 
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cal theory, a person who is an "insider" of a corporation with fiduciary 
duties violates Rule 10b-5 by buying and selling securities on the ba-
sis of material, nonpublic information.82 Misappropriation theory ex-
tends the reach of Rule 10b-5 to "outsiders."83 It imposes liability for 
fraud on any person who: 
· (1) misappropriates material nonpublic information 
(2) by breaching a duty arising out of a relationship of trust 
and confidence and 
(3) uses that information in a securities transaction 
(4) regardless of whether he owed any duties to the share-
holders of the traded stock. 8 4 
The premise of this theory is that the trader breached a fiduciary ob-
ligation to the "giver" of material non public information, regardless of 
any particular tie to the transaction. 
A considerable body of caselaw supports the misappropriation 
theory in insider trading cases. For instance, the court in United 
States v. Newman,85 affirmed the conviction of investment bankers 
who exploited their clients' secret takeover plans. The court held 
that the investment bankers' transactions breached their fiduciary 
duties of confidentiality and loyalty to their employers even though 
they did not owe a duty to the corporation whose securities were 
traded.86 See also SEC v. Clark,87 where the Ninth Circuit reviewed 
the conviction of an employee who used material, nonpublic informa-
tion regarding his employer's plans to acquire another company. The 
court wrote that the "misappropriation theory fits comfortably within 
the meaning of 'fraud' in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."88 
However, other courts attacked the misappropriation theory. In 
United States v. Bryan,89 for instance, the court decided that the 
principle will not support a conviction where the giver of misappro-
priated information is not a purchaser or seller or is not connected 
with or in any way interested in the securities transactions itself.90 
The court found that reading the words of Section 10(b), "in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security," did not support the 
use of the misappropriation theory.91 Furthermore, the breach of 
82. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 616 (8th Cir. 1996). 
83. S.E.C. v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 
(1992). 
84. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995). 
85. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). 
86. ld. at 16. 
87. 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990). 
88. ld. at 449. See also, United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1996). 
89. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995). 
90. ld. at 952-53. 
91. ld. at 946-47. 
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duty under the misappropriation theory did not entail "deception" 
within the language of Section 10(b).92 
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. O'Hagan93 adopted the 
Bryan court's reasoning in reversing the conviction of an attorney 
who used material, nonpublic information. In O'Hagan, Grand Met 
hired a law firm to assist with a possible tender offer for common 
stock of the Pillsbury Company. A partner in the firm began 
purchasing call options on Pillsbury stock before Grand Met an-
nounced its tender offer for the stock, and later sold the call options 
for a large profit.94 The court wrote that "fraud under Rule lOb-5 
cannot be construed more broadly than its statutory enabler, decep-
tion."95 Section lO(b) requires both deception and false statements 
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."96 According 
to the appeals court, misappropriation theory mandates neither de-
ception nor the "in connection with" requirement of the Act. Only a 
breach of a duty to the parties to the securities transaction would be 
sufficient to give rise to Section lO(b) criminalliability.97 
The issue has now been clearly resolved by the United States 
Supreme Court, with its decision reversing the Eighth Circuit in 
O'Hagan.98 
O'Hagan Case 
The Supreme Court held that misappropriation theory could 
form the basis of criminal liability under Rule lO(b). Justice Gins-
berg, for the majority, wrote that the purpose of misappropriation 
theory is to "protect [the] integrity of the securities markets against 
abuses by outsiders to [a] corporation who have access to confidential 
information that will affect [the] corporation's securities price when 
revealed, but who owe no fiduciary or other duty to that corporation's 
shareholders."99 In order for criminal liability under Rule lO(b) to 
exist, there is a statutory requirement that there be "deceptive" con-
duct "in connection with" a securities transaction. 100 The deception 
here was not between the parties in the securities transaction, but 
was in actions of a source of the information. In accordance with the 
92. Id. at 949-50. 
93. 92 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1995). 
94. Id. at 614. 
95. Id. at 615. 
96. Id. at 617. 
97. Id. 
98. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997). 
99. ld. at 2207 (emphasis added). It will be recalled that the purchaser of call 
options was a private lawyer whose client was the prospective acquiror, Grand Met, 
and the options concerned stock in the prospective target company, Pillsbury. Thus, 
it would be difficult-if not impossible-to use classical insider trading theory, because 
the lawyer owed no fiduciary duty to shareholders of Pillsbury. 
100. Id. at 2206. 
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statutory language, the government also must prove a person "will-
fully" violated Rule lO(b) in order for criminal liability to exist. In the 
majority's opinion, this mandate was enough to discount O'Hagan's 
argument that the misappropriations theory is too indefinite to sup-
port the imposition of criminalliability.1o1 
The Court found that the "deceptive" conduct requirement was 
met when the lawyer for Grand Met used the confidential informa-
tion he obtained for his own personal gain in the trading of securities 
without informing the source of the information, his law firm, of his 
intentions to do so.102 Of course, had he fully disclosed his intentions 
to the source of the information there would be no criminal liability, 
because the necessary "deceptive" conduct requirement would not 
have been met. 103 The Court also held that the misappropriation the-
ory satisfies the statutory requirement that the deceptive use of infor-
mation be "in connection with the purchase or sale of security," 
because the "fraud is consummated, not when he obtains the confi-
dential information, but when, without disclosure to the principal, he 
uses the information in purchasing or selling securities."104 The doc-
trine, however, could not be used in all fraud cases: 
The misappropriation theory would not ... apply to a case in 
which a person defrauded a bank into giving him a loan or 
embezzled cash from another, and then used the proceeds of 
the misdeeds to purchase securities .... The proceeds would 
have value to the malefactor apart from their use in a securi-
ties transaction, and the fraud would be complete as soon as 
the money was obtained.105 
Because such a situation would not satisfy the "in connection with" 
trade in securities requirement of Rule lO(b), no criminal liability 
would apply. The Court concluded with a strong statement in support 
of the rationale for the misappropriation theory. 
The misappropriation theory comports with § lO(b)'s 
language, which requires deception "in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security," not deception of an identifi-
able purchaser or seller. The theory is also well-tuned to an 
animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure honest se-
curities markets and thereby promote investor confidence. 
(Trading on misappropriated information "undermines the 
integrity of, and investor confidence in, the securities mar-
kets"). Although informational disparity is inevitable in the 
securities markets, investors likely would hesitate to ven-
101. Id. at 2214. 
102. Id. at 2211. 
103. ld. at 2209. 
104. ld. 
105. Id. 
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ture their capital in a market where trading based on misap-
propriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law. An 
investor's informational disadvantage vis-a-vis a misap-
propriator with material, nonpublic information stems from 
contrivance, not luck; it is a disadvantage that cannot be 
overcome with research or skill. 106 
CoNCLUSION 
Numerous criminal statutes are used to regulate financial securi-
ties markets in the United States. In this article, some of the most 
significant such laws have been considered. They include general 
criminal offenses tailored to emphasize market abuses, laws such as 
conspiracy, RICO and fraud. In addition, the specific Federal securi-
ties laws, the 1933 and 1934 Acts, have criminal provisions that can 
be utilized effectively in this area. 
The particular features of the individual statutory approaches 
appear to matter far less than a commitment on the part of the gov-
ernment to attack vigorously abuses in the financial markets. This 
sort of commitment, when combined with the potent civil actions 
available, will move to ensure public confidence to an area in which 
skepticism is often present. 
106. Id. at 2210. In general, insider trading laws are increasingly common in other 
countries and, to varying degrees are motivated in part by U.S. insider trading juris-
prudence. In recent years, for example, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, 
and the Philippines have enacted such laws. However, aside from problems of en-
forcement, a critical issue is whether misappropriation theory, and the Court's above-
quoted conclusion, will be adopted in foreign jurisdictions. 
